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The Japanese banking system provides a distinctive platform for the examination of the long-lasting
effect of problem loans on efﬁciency. We measure technical efﬁciency by modifying a translog enhanced
hyperbolic distance function with two undesirable outputs, identiﬁed as problem loans and problem
other earning assets. Our unique database allows us to distinguish between bankrupt and restructured
loans to investigate the underlying causality between these loans and efﬁciency. From the ﬂexible panel
vector autoregression speciﬁcation, primary results reveal that bankrupt loans have a positive impact on
efﬁciency related to the ‘‘moral hazard, skimping’’ hypothesis, with the causality originating from
bankrupt loans. In contrast, ﬁndings for the relationship between restructured loans and efﬁciency
support the ‘‘bad luck’’ hypothesis.
 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
An unprecedented escalation of nonperforming loans in the
Japanese banking sector during the 1990s triggered a prolonged
economic downturn. During the turmoil, the government under-
took its stabilisation scheme by providing deposit insurance,
injecting public capital, and bailing out troubled banks (Hoshi
and Kashyap, 2010; Montgomery and Shimizutani, 2009). The
expensive bailouts and intervention policies helped banks to
reduce the volume of nonperforming loans from ¥30 trillion in
1997 to ¥11.6 trillion in 2008. However, the Japanese government
was criticised for its procrastination, in particular earlier in the
banking crisis, as some considerable lags in response were
recorded. Moreover, before 1997, banks had been struggling to
deal with the increase in problem loans whilst indecisive
government exacerbated the situation (Giannetti and Simonov,
2013; Hayashi and Prescott, 2002; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010).
Overall, government intervention has been effective in pullingtroubled banks out of the turmoil and relaxing the ﬁnancial
distress, yet it is factual that earlier indecisiveness prolonged the
period of disruption, thereby hindering bank performance
recovery. These unique features of the Japanese banking system
make the investigation of the detrimental effect of problem loans
on efﬁciency worthwhile.
Unlike most studies on Japanese banking which consider non-
performing loans as a control variable or a proxy for risk
(Altunbas et al., 2000; Drake and Hall, 2003; Liu and Tone, 2008),
this paper follows a new strand of the literature by treating
nonperforming loans as an undesirable output in bank efﬁciency
measurement (Barros et al., 2012; Fukuyama and Weber, 2008;
Glass et al., 2014). We explore how nonperforming loans affect
bank technical efﬁciency, as well as the causality of the relation-
ship between risks (identiﬁed as bankrupt and restructured loans)
and efﬁciency.
This study is different from previous empirical research on bank
efﬁciency in Japan in the following ways. First, we propose an inno-
vative way of estimating bank efﬁciency by using a translog
enhanced hyperbolic output distance function as introduced by
Cuesta et al., 2009. The advantage of deploying this parametric
approach is to allow for a simultaneous expansion of desirableinance
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we modify the model with a vector of two undesirable outputs
(problem loans and problem other earning assets1) using
semi-annual data. In this paper, we use the term ‘‘problem loans’’
instead of nonperforming loans to be consistent with the classiﬁca-
tion of problem assets under the Financial Reconstruction Law. We
argue that while problem loans are by-products of loans, problem
other earning assets are by-products of other earning assets.
Beside conventional banking operations, Japanese commercial banks
also invest in government bonds, corporate bonds and securities, as
well as offer non-traditional banking services such as guarantees and
acceptances. Thus, the inclusion of problem other earning assets in
the undesirable output vector would control for the effect of these
problem assets on bank efﬁciency. Such an analysis has not yet been
conducted because of the limitation of previous models and data
unavailability. Third, our semi-annual data range covers a long time
span from 2000 to 2012, embracing the restructuring period, the
global ﬁnancial crisis, as well as the aftermaths of the crisis.
In addition, we investigate the impact of bankrupt loans
and restructured loans on bank efﬁciency. No previous studies
explored this particular issue. These types of loans are
disaggregated from our data of risk-monitored loans of Japanese
commercial banks.2 Bankrupt loans are loans to borrowers in
legal bankruptcy and past due loans by 6 months or more.
Restructured loans are named after the sum of past due loans by
3 months but less than 6 months and restructured loans. We argue
that bankrupt loans and restructured loans measure the level of risk
held within Japanese banks. The increase of these loans could be
attributed to both bank managers and exogenous shocks. Given
endogeneity concerns, we further examine the underlying dynamic
relationship between bankrupt loans/restructured loans, bank speci-
ﬁc and macroeconomic variables, and technical efﬁciency within a
panel Vector Autoregression (VAR) model. This method grants the
opportunity to explore important causality hypotheses between
bankrupt, restructured loans and efﬁciency. Following Berger and
DeYoung (1997) and Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis
(2009), we address four renowned hypotheses: ‘‘bad luck’’, ‘‘bad
management’’, ‘‘skimping/moral hazard’’, and ‘‘risk-averse manage-
ment’’. Our results show that the relationship between bankrupt
loans and technical efﬁciency resembles the ‘‘moral hazard’’ and
‘‘skimping’’ hypothesis, with the causality running from bankrupt
loans to efﬁciency. Restructured loans, on the other hand, affect
technical efﬁciency in line with the ‘‘bad luck’’ hypothesis.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2
provides an overview of the restructuring process and problem
loans in Japan. Section 3 summarises the literature on Japanese
banking efﬁciency with an incorporation of problem loans.
Methodology is presented in section 4. Section 5 describes our data
set and variable selection. Results are discussed in section 6.
Finally, concluding remarks and policy implications are offered in
section 7.2. The Japanese restructuring process and problem loans
In this section, we brieﬂy overview the main bottlenecks in the
Japanese banking sector. In particular, we focus on the restructur-
ing process and problem loans that in our view had a crucial
impact on bank efﬁciency.
In response to the central issue of impaired loans which were a
consequence of the outburst of asset price bubble, Japanese1 The names and deﬁnitions are in accordance with the Financial Reconstruction
Law. Problem loans are bankrupt, quasi-bankrupt, doubtful, and substandard loans.
Problem other earning assets are bankrupt, quasi-bankrupt and doubtful other
earning assets (please see Data section and Appendix A for more details).
2 See Data section and Appendix A for more details.
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the ﬁnancial health of the banking system. First, capital injection
programs were implemented ﬁve times from March 1998 to
March 2009. In 1998, under the Financial Revitalisation Plan,
nearly two third of public fund injected was to fully protect depos-
itors of insolvent banks and purchase their assets (Montgomery
and Shimizutani, 2009). Second, in 2002, the Financial Services
Agency forced banks to liquidate poorly performing companies’
shares. However, the Bank of Japan eventually had to buy those
bank-held shares directly. Third, the government approved
accounting changes which permitted banks to record either book
or market values for their holdings of stocks in other ﬁrms and real
estate holdings. This procedure raised the value of bank assets at
that time when market values were reported, even though those
market prices were far below their highest records. Nevertheless,
in 2001, the government required those values to be switched back
to their book ones (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010).
Apart from the abovementioned schemes, the wave of bank con-
solidation evolved among large banks to strengthen their resistance
to ﬁnancial severity. Mergers between City Banks (Mitsui Bank and
Taiyo-Kobe Bank to form Sakura; Fuji, Dai-Ichi Kanyo, and Industrial
Bank of Japan to formMizuho Bank; Sanwa and Tokai Banks to form
UFJ Banks; UFJ Banks and Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi; Sumitomo and
Sakura (Nakamura, 2006)) led a strong incentive for weaker banks
to be consolidated. Yet, the effects of mergers and acquisitions in
the Japanese banking industry appeared unsuccessful in stabilising
the ﬁnancial market and reducing the probability of failure
(Harada and Ito, 2011; Hosono et al., 2006).
Nonetheless, the government has been criticised for their lend-
ing facilitation policies. The (misdirected) lending to unproﬁtable
ﬁrms (‘‘zombie lending’’) was blamed to encumber the effort to
diminish problem loans. The fact that Main banks (City Banks)
rescued poorly performing ﬁrms at the expense of their well per-
forming counterparts (Lincoln et al., 1996) led to an emergence
of ‘‘zombie lending’’. Banks could also have the perverse incentive
not to write off bad debts to avoid the loss of capital, which could
result in a failure to comply with Basel I capital adequacy stan-
dards (Watanabe, 2010). Thus, the ﬁnancing to these ‘‘zombies’’
borrowers weakened the restructuring process in Japan and
deterred healthy ﬁrms and banks from recovering. On the other
hand, after 1998, the Japanese government promoted lending to
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), hoping to mitigate
the turbulent situation and resurrect the economy. This policy
particularly called for banks rescued by public capital, even the
weakest ﬁnancial institutions (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). Hence,
the core of problem loans shifted from real estate lending to small
and medium enterprise ﬁnancing. The fact that problem loans to
assets ratios in Regional Banks I and II are somewhat higher than
in City Banks over time (see Fig. 1) provides further support for this
argument as SMEs are Regional Banks’ target customers. Regional
Banks, by channelling credit to SMEs, are supposed to support
the local development of their prefectures where their head ofﬁces
are situated. In addition, credit risk for those banks is a non-trivial
concern despite the crisis-related interventions, which may under-
estimate the true magnitude of SMEs’ problem loans (Hoshi, 2011;
International Monetary Fund, 2012). These developments led to
changes in the regulatory framework so as to adjust problem loans’
deﬁnition in an attempt to redeem some credits for bad loans of
SMEs. Along these lines, more than 50% the amount of problem
loans held by Regional Banks between September 2008 and
March 2009 were reclassiﬁed as normal (Hoshi, 2011). It is argued
that a large number of bad debts were in disguise until the end of
March 2012. About 3–6% of total credit in Regional Banks was
reclassiﬁed under the SME Financing Facilitation Act, compared
to 1.7% for City Banks and Trust Banks (International Monetary
Fund, 2012).nkrupt and restructured loans on Japanese bank efﬁciency?. J. Bank Finance
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Fig. 1. Problem loans to assets ratios in Japanese commercial banks 2000–2012.
Notes: This Figure illustrates the ratio of problem loans to assets of Japanese
commercial banks during 2000–2012. PLA: Problem loans to assets; S: September;
00–12: 2000–2012.
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mance on the banking system.3 High public sector indebtedness
and slow growth are amongst the most important factors accumulat-
ing the latent risk within ﬁnancial institutions (International
Monetary Fund, 2012). Fewer proﬁtable investment projects, limited
credit demand, economic stagnation characterised by long-term
deﬂation and sluggish growth are all obstacles to a sound ﬁnancial
system, slowing down the recovery process of the economy.
Hence, robust growth is a necessary condition of a successful bank
recapitalisation. Yet, the causality could also be of the reverse nature
as the dysfunction of the ﬁnancial system retards macroeconomic
rebound (Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010). Besides, existing problematic
ﬁrms would ﬁnd themselves struggling to overcome the bottlenecks
and face high accumulative operating costs. To deal with this
long-lasting effect and the threat of deterioration, the Bank of
Japan introduced quantitative easing as a monetary policy tool to
stimulate aggregate demand and boost the country’s productivity
(Bank of Japan statement, 19 March 20014). Virtually zero interest
rate had been maintained until 2006. At times, although GDP growth
was not adequate to defeat deﬂation, the stimulating effect of quan-
titative easing on aggregate demand could not be denied (Bowman
et al., 2011). The monetary easing policy was extended in 2010
due to major concerns about heightened price instability arisen from
negative spill over effects from slowdown overseas economies.
Aggressive monetary easing has been launched ever since to support
the Abenomics5 – the strategic economic policy proposed by the
newly appointed Prime Minister in 2012.3. Literature review
For a review of the literature, we revise bank efﬁciency studies
where problem loans play an important part in the analysis. A
number of studies use problem loans as covariates to identify their
impact on bank efﬁciency among other independent variables. For
instance, problem loans are treated as a proxy for asset quality3 The authors thank an anonymous referee for this helpful suggestion.
4 Bank of Japan’s statements, 2001 (http://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/
release_2001/k010319a.htm/).
5 The priority aims are: (i) reconstruction and disaster prevention; (ii) creation of
wealth through growth; (iii) securing safety of livelihood of regional revitalisation.
The priority areas are documented on the Prime Minister website, January 11, 2013.
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Satake, 2009) or a measure of risk (Lensink et al., 2008). Hughes
and Mester (1993) ﬁnd that inefﬁciency is positively correlated
to problem loans. Berger and DeYoung (1997), however, do not
control for loan quality in the cost function. They assume that
problem loans may be considered exogenous for a given bank if
these loans are unexpected results of ‘‘bad luck’’, or endogenous
if they are due to ‘‘bad management’’ or ‘‘skimping’’ (actions taken
by management). Under the ‘‘bad luck’’ hypothesis, an increase in
nonperforming loans (which is considered exogenous for the bank)
would lead to a decrease in efﬁciency. The rise in bad loans is
caused by unforeseen shocks (for example natural disasters) that
affect the repayment ability of debtors. In contrast, for all other
hypotheses that Berger and DeYoung (1997) address, the
heightened level of problem loans stems from the bank itself.
‘‘Bad management’’ refers to the incompetence of bank managers
regarding credit screening, collateral evaluating, and loan monitor-
ing as they are also cost-inefﬁcient managers. On the other hand,
for ambitious managers, the fact that abnormal returns could help
secure their position and bring on more bonuses could induce
them to take on risky projects. It could also be a transfer of lower
short-term costs to forthcoming risks so as to maximize long-term
proﬁt. To achieve their goals, bank managers could skip some man-
agement practices in the loan screening-monitoring process, caus-
ing the bank to appear more efﬁcient due to fewer operating costs.
That is how the ‘‘skimping’’ hypothesis explains the rise in problem
loans from an increase in efﬁciency. Magnifying the outcomes of
these three hypotheses, the ‘‘moral hazard’’ hypothesis expresses
that banks with relatively low capital may have the incentives to
involve in risky loan portfolios as the risk is partly shifted to
another party. Empirical results of Berger and DeYoung (1997)
deliver support for the ‘‘bad luck’’ hypothesis, but for the whole
industry, the results tend to favour the ‘‘bad management’’ one.
Berger and Mester (1997) also include problem loans ratio as an
environmental variable in the Fourier-ﬂexible model. The ﬁndings
support the ‘‘bad management’’ hypothesis of Berger and DeYoung
(1997) and reveal a statistically signiﬁcant positive relationship
between problem loans and total cost. Also testing these hypothe-
ses, Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis (2009) convey the
‘‘moral hazard’’ hypothesis in a similar aspect to the ‘‘skimping’’
one by emphasising the link between efﬁciency and risk. To pursue
expansionary strategy, it could be tempting for an efﬁcient bank to
take on more risks which might not be paid off eventually. This
study also introduces the ‘‘risk-averse management’’ hypothesis,
which refers to risk-intolerant bank managers whose prudential
supervision could cause large operating costs in the short-term
(subsequently, higher inefﬁciency) but prevent a high rate of
default in the future.
In our study, we will consider the relation of these aforemen-
tioned hypotheses and problem loans in Japan. On top of that,
we argue that problem loans should be treated as an undesirable
output vector in bank production process. Berg et al. (1992) intro-
duce this concept for Norwegian banks. (Negative) loan loss is
included in the output vector to measure the quality of loans in
two benchmark years. Park and Weber (2006) argue that these
loans should be treated as an undesirable output rather than an
input in a bank’s production. A number of banking research then
has accounted for problem loans directly in their methodology
(Assaf et al., 2013; Barros et al., 2012; Fujii et al., 2014;
Fukuyama and Weber, 2008).
Since the Japanese banking system has been chronically clogged
by problem loans, it has become an exclusive laboratory for
investigating the impact of these loans on bank efﬁciency. There
is also a variety of methods in addressing problem loans in
Japanese bank literature. Considering loan-loss provision as a
control factor for output quality, Altunbas et al. (2000) examinenkrupt and restructured loans on Japanese bank efﬁciency?. J. Bank Finance
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1996. Overall inefﬁciency scores appear to be between 0.05–
0.069 for all 4 years whether or not risk and quality factors are
controlled for. Problem loans, in this study, are found to have little
effect on scale economies and X-efﬁciency. Liu and Tone (2008)
also include the ratio of problem loans as a bank characteristic
variable in a cost frontier analysis.
Unlike other studies, Drake and Hall (2003) choose to include
problem loans as an uncontrollable input when estimating
Japanese banking efﬁciency by DEA model. Following Berger and
Humphrey (1997), they consider bad loans as a result of ‘‘bad luck’’
rather than ‘‘bad management’’. Loan-loss provision is used as an
indicator of the extent of problem loans. It is emphasised that
although in the DEA model, uncontrollable inputs are held ﬁxed,
in effect; it is somewhat under the bank’s discretion as the
management board is able to adjust the level of provision.
After the basic DEA model is modiﬁed for the inclusion of
non-discretionary input, the associated ﬁndings imply a reward
for banks with good control of problem loans as mean pure techni-
cal efﬁciency increases from 72.36 to 89.38 for ﬁnancial year 1997.
In contrast to Drake and Hall (2003), Fukuyama and Weber
(2008) argue that problem loans should be treated as an undesir-
able output as they appear only after a loan has been made. Data
for Japanese banks are pooled over a three-year period (2002–
2004), with an assumption that a common technology exists for
all banks. The ﬁndings present that the null-jointness hypothesis
between good output and bad output is satisﬁed, indicating that
problem loans are a by-product of the loan generating process.
Similarly, Barros et al. (2012) measure technical efﬁciency of
Japanese banks (2000–2007) with the appearance of problem loans
as an undesirable output. They apply a non-radial directional
methodology, which involves the expansion of good outputs and
the contraction of inputs and bad outputs directionally by the
nonzero vector g = (gx, gy, gb). The ﬁnding suggests that the
problem of nonperforming loans was not completely wiped out,
although the process of revitalisation had been taken place.
To this end, our paper contributes to the existing efﬁciency lit-
erature about Japanese banks in terms of methodology employed
and data used to measure bank efﬁciency. The translog enhanced
hyperbolic distance function proposed by Cuesta et al. (2009)
allows us to directly estimate the impact of problem loans on
efﬁciency. In addition, the introduction of problem other earning
assets in the undesirable output vector is innovative and accounts
for the non-traditional operations of Japanese banks.
4. Methodology
Our methodology is underpinned by Cuesta et al.’s (2009)
model. The enhanced hyperbolic distance function6 takes the form
of:
Dðx; y; bÞ ¼ inff/ > 0 : ðx/; y=/; b/Þ 2 Tg ð1Þ
with input vector xi ¼ ðx1i; x2i; . . . ; xkiÞ 2 RKþ, desirable output vector
yi ¼ ðy1i; y2i; . . . ; ymiÞ 2 RMþ , and undesirable output vector bi ¼
ðb1i; b2i; . . . ; briÞ 2 RRþ
The technology T represents the production possibility set:
T ¼ fðx; y; bÞ : x 2 RKþ; ðy; bÞ 2 RPþ; xcan produceðy; bÞg such that
RPþ expresses the set of all u ¼ ðy; bÞ output vectors obtainable
from x.6 The enhanced hyperbolic distance function has a range 0 < Dðx; y; bÞ 6 1, assum-
ing inputs and outputs are weakly disposable. It has the following properties: (i) it is
almost homogeneous Dðl1x;ly;l1bÞ ¼ lDðx; y; bÞ;l > 0, (ii) it is non-decreasing in
desirable outputs Dðx; ky; bÞ 6 Dðx; y; bÞ; k 2 ½0;1 (iii) it is non-increasing in undesir-
able outputs Dðx; y; kbÞ 6 Dðx; y; bÞ; kP 1 (iv) it is non-increasing in inputs
Dðkx; y; bÞ 6 Dðx; y; bÞ; kP 1.
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Eq. (1) expresses a simultaneous expansion in good outputs y and
shrinkage in inputs x and bad outputs b, generating a hyperbolic
path. If Dðx; y; bÞ ¼ 1, the production of the observed unit lies on
theproduction frontier and is efﬁcient. Thus, ifDðx; y; bÞ < 1, thepro-
ducer is inefﬁcient and could improve their performance by increas-
ing desirable outputs and cutting undesirable outputs and inputs.
Applying a translog speciﬁcation for Dðx; y; bÞ, it yields:
lnD ¼ a0 þ
XK
k¼1
ak ln xki þ
XM
m¼1
bm ln ymi þ
XR
r¼1
vr ln bri
þ 1
2
XK
k¼1
XK
l¼1
akl ln xki ln xli þ 12
XM
m¼1
XM
n¼1
bmn ln ymi ln yni
þ 1
2
XR
r¼1
XR
s¼1
vrs ln bri ln bsi þ
XK
k¼1
XM
m¼1
dkm ln xki ln ymi
þ
XK
k¼1
XR
r¼1
ckr ln xki ln bri þ
XM
m¼1
XR
r¼1
gmr ln ymi ln bri ð2Þ
Imposing the almost homogeneity condition and choosing the Mth
desirable output for normalising purpose l ¼ 1=yM , we obtain:
D xyM;
y
yM
; byM
 
¼ Dðx; y; bÞ
yM
ð3Þ
with xki ¼ xki  yMi; ymi ¼ ymi=YMi; bri ¼ bri  yMi, the translog function
takes the form:
lnðD=yMiÞ ¼ a0 þ
XK
k¼1
ak ln xki þ
XM1
m¼1
bm ln y

mi þ
XR
r¼1
vr ln b

ri
þ 1
2
XK
k¼1
XK
l¼1
akl ln xki ln x

li þ
1
2
XM1
m¼1
XM1
n¼1
bmn ln y

mi ln y

ni
þ 1
2
XR
r¼1
XR
s¼1
vrs ln b

ri ln b

si þ
XK
k¼1
XM1
m¼1
dkm ln xki ln y

mi
þ
XK
k¼1
XR
r¼1
ckr ln x

ki ln b

ri þ
XM1
m¼1
XR
r¼1
gmr ln y

mi ln b

ri ð4Þ
We can write Eq. (4) in a simplifying form of:
lnðD=yMitÞ ¼ TLðxit ; yit; bit;a;b;v; d; c;gÞ þ v it i ¼ ð1;2; . . . ;NÞ ð5Þ
As lnD corresponds to the one-sided distance component ui, by
rearranging it we get:
 lnðyMitÞ ¼ TLðxit ; yit ; bit;a;b;v; d; c;gÞ þ v it  uit i ¼ ð1;2; . . . ;NÞ
ð6Þ
where –ln(yMit) is the log of the Mth desirable output, vit is the
stochastic error which follows a normal distribution, uit is the inef-
ﬁciency term.7
The stochastic frontier approach enables researchers to decom-
pose the usual error term, eit, into two components: the two-sided
random error, and the one-sided inefﬁciency term to capture
inefﬁciency. We assume that the inefﬁciency term follows a half
normal distribution N(0,r2u). It reﬂects the distribution of
non-negative u values drawn from a population which is normally
distributed with zero mean.
Thus, the translog enhanced hyperbolic distance function takes
the form8:7 We can now estimate Eq. (6) with various methods, e.g. maximum likelihood
estimation (Battese and Coelli, 1988) where the technical efﬁciency of each observed
unit is expressed as TEit = exp(uit) (Battese and Coelli, 1992; Greene, 2005).
8 We specify model (7) for three inputs, two desirable outputs, and two undesirable
outputs (see Data section). y2 (net earning assets) normalises other output and input
variables.
nkrupt and restructured loans on Japanese bank efﬁciency?. J. Bank Finance
12 Our inputs and outputs speciﬁcation is similar to Fukuyama and Weber (2008,
2009), Barros et al. (2009, 2012).
13 As data for number of employees are not available semi-annually.
14 The values of problem other earning assets = Problem assets  Risk-monitored
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X3
k¼1
ak ln xki þ
X1
m¼1
bm ln y

mi þ
X2
r¼1
vr lnb

ri
þ 1
2
X3
k¼1
X3
l¼1
akl ln xki ln x

li þ
1
2
X1
m¼1
X1
n¼1
bmn ln y

mi ln y

ni
þ 1
2
X2
r¼1
X2
s¼1
vrs ln b

ri lnb

si þ
X3
k¼1
X1
m¼1
dkm ln xki ln y

mi
þ
X3
k¼1
X2
r¼1
ckr ln x

ki ln b

ri þ
X1
m¼1
X2
r¼1
gmr ln y

mi lnb

ri þ at
þ 1
2
bt2 þ
X3
k¼1
ckt ln xkit þ
X1
m¼1
dmt ln ymit þ
X2
r¼1
f rt
 lnbrit þ mit  uit ð7Þ
It is very unlikely that technology is constant over time; there-
fore, we incorporate time variable t to capture neutral technical
change. We estimate Eq. (7) using time-varying decay technique,
following Battese and Coelli (1992).
5. Data
Our dataset is drawn from semi-annually ﬁnancial reports of
Japanese commercial banks during 2000–2012, published on the
Japanese Bankers Association website. We obtain an unbalanced
panel data with 3036 observations, embracing City Banks,
Regional Banks I, and Regional Banks II.
Being the largest commercial banks in Japan, City Banks com-
prise of nationwide branching institutions. Their primary funding
sources vary from the Bank of Japan to the deposit and
short-term ﬁnancial markets. They also involve in securities–type
operations domestically and internationally (Drake and Hall,
2003; Tadesse, 2006). In contrast, Regional Banks I are smaller than
City Banks and operate only in the principal cities of the prefec-
tures where their head ofﬁces are situated. They have a strong
commitment with the local development through ﬁnancing small
and medium business activities. Regional Banks II9 are similar to
Regional Banks I in terms of business features, but smaller than
Regional Banks I in size. They also offer ﬁnancial services for
customers within their immediate geographical regions.
In the data set, six banks report negative shareholders’ equity in
2000–2007. Three of those banks (Ashikaga Bank, Kinki Osaka
Bank, and Tokyo Sowa Bank) were bailed out to continue operating.
On 12/6/1999, the Bank of Japan announced to provide necessary
funds to assist the business continuation of Tokyo Sowa Bank.10
Tokyo Sowa Bank only had negative equity and net income in
September 2000. Ashikaga Bank also received liquidity support for
undercapitalisation and income loss in September 2003.11 Unlike
Tokyo Sowa Bank, Ashikaga Bank could not raise enough capital at
the end of the ﬁrst halves of ﬁscal years 2004–2007. After
September 2007, Ashikaga Bank operation was restored. On the
other hand, Kinki Osaka Bank suffered from capital loss only in
September 2003. The Bank of Japan did not intervene in the case
of Kinki Osaka Bank as it gained positive equity in the following per-
iod. Unlike these three banks which have successfully recovered
from the banking turbulence and continued their normal operation,
the other three banks (Kofuku Bank, Ishikawa Bank, and Chubu
Bank) were unable to survive through the crisis and had to terminate
their business after September 2002 and 2003.9 Regional Banks II are also called members of the Second Association of Regional
Banks (Japanese Bankers Association website – Principle Financial Institutions).
10 Bank of Japan’s statements (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/press/
danwa/dan9906b.htm/).
11 Bank of Japan’s statements (https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/press/
danwa/dan0311a.htm/).
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commercial banks used in Eq. (7),12 we follow the widely used
intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 1977). We characterise
three proxies for inputs: x1 interest expenses (Glass et al., 2014; Liu
and Tone, 2008), x2 ﬁxed assets (Assaf et al., 2011; Fukuyama and
Weber, 2008), and x3 general and administrative expenses13 (Drake
and Hall, 2003; Liu and Tone, 2008). We deﬁne our outputs in line
with Barros et al. (2009), Assaf et al. (2011), Barros et al. (2012) as
y1 net loans and bills discounted, and y2 net earning assets which
include net investments, securities, and other earning assets. Data
are adjusted for inﬂation using semi-annual GDP deﬂator
(2005 = 100). Table 1 describes the summary statistics of key
variables in our panel data.
Turning to problem loans, a loan is deﬁned as non-performing if
payment of interests and principal are past due by 90 days or more,
or if there are doubts that debt payments can be made in full. The
availability of data allows us to distinguish the two classiﬁcations
of problem assets in Japan. They are ‘‘risk-monitored loans’’ dis-
closed in accordance with the Banking Law, and ‘‘problem assets’’
disclosed under the Financial Reconstruction Law. According to
the Financial Reconstruction Law, problem other earning assets
(claims related to securities lending, foreign exchanges, accrued
interests, suspense payments, customers’ liabilities for acceptances
and guarantees, and bank-guaranteed bonds sold through private
placements) are subject to the disclosure of problem assets. We
follow the problem assets deﬁnition based on the Financial
Reconstruction Law to deﬁne undesirable outputs in our efﬁciency
estimation (please see Appendix A). The ﬁrst undesirable output is
problem loans b1, the second one is problem other earning assets b2.
Problem loans are bankrupt, quasi-bankrupt loans, doubtful loans,
and substandard loans. Problem other earning assets are bankrupt,
quasi-bankrupt and doubtful other earning assets.14 The disclosed
information from our data set is quite novel as it is for the ﬁrst time
that undesirable outputs are disaggregated into problem loans and
problem other earning assets. The only study that we are aware of
is Barros et al. (2012) but they did not disaggregate the data.
To represent the level of risk, we employ data of risk-monitored
loans disclosed subject to the Banking Law (see Appendix A).
Another innovation of this paper is that we further disaggregate
risk-monitored loans into two components: the ﬁrst one is the
sum of bankrupt loans and non-accrual loans,15 the second one is
the sum of past due loans by 3 months or more but less than
6 months, and restructured loans.16 To facilitate the analysis and
the exposition of results, we name the ﬁrst class of risk-monitored
loans as bankrupt loans, whereas the second class is the restructured
loans. These two types of risk-monitored loans contain information
about the level of risk held in each bank, and partly reﬂect the exoge-
nous impact of problem loans on bank operation. In the short-run,
banks somewhat rely on their borrowers to reduce the level of these
risk-monitored loans. This disaggregation permits us to further
examine the relationship between bankrupt loans, restructured
loans and bank efﬁciency.
To account for bank speciﬁc characteristics, we opt for perfor-
mance variables which are represented by return on assetsloans (see Appendix A for more details).
15 Reported in Japanese commercial banks’ balance sheets, these loans are loans to
borrowers in the state of legal bankruptcy, and past due loans in arrears of six months
or more.
16 The Japanese Bankers Association originally deﬁned restructured loans as loans
for which interest rates were lowered. In 1997, the deﬁnition was extended to loans
with any amended contract conditions and loans to corporations under ongoing
reorganisation (Montgomery and Shimizutani, 2009).
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Name Mean Std.Dev Min Max
y1 Net loans 3,182,876 7,867,099 109898.9 69,541,992
y2 Net earning assets 2,178,294 7,419,522 1296.512 78,517,385
b1 Problem loans 143582.6 371639.3 5207.246 6,060,743
b2 Problem non-loan assets 4294.59 16352.12 0 280,278
x1 Interest expenses 17093.14 80852.25 45.966 1,379,955
x2 Fixed assets 60392.48 141052.1 2463.104 1,278,986
x3 General and administrative expenses 37441.04 88237.43 1438.638 1,086,994
Total assets 5,833,343 16,390,968 172,320 151,697,392
cap Capital ratio 0.04324 0.02552 0.78823 0.12787
NIM Net interest margin 0.01329 0.00553 0.00076 0.03794
ROA Return on assets 0.00013 0.0084 0.29452 0.05886
Notes: y1, y2, x1, x2, x3, b1, b2, total assets are in million Yen. Net loans = Loans and bills discounted-Problem loans. Net earning assets = (call loans, receivables under resale
agreement, receivables under securities borrowing transactions, bills bought, monetary claims bought, foreign exchanges, customers’ liabilities for acceptances and guar-
antees, investment securities, and other assets) – problem other earning assets. Problem loans are bankrupt, quasi-bankrupt, doubtful, and substandard loans. Problem other
earning assets are bankrupt, quasi-bankrupt, and doubtful other earning assets. Capital ratio = shareholders’equity/total assets. Net interest margin = (interest income–
interest expense)/(interest-earning assets). Std.Dev: standard deviation.
6 E. Mamatzakis et al. / Journal of Banking & Finance xxx (2015) xxx–xxx(ROA), and net interest margin (NIM) (Glass et al., 2014). NIM is
deﬁned by the difference between interest incomes and interest
expenses to total interest-earning assets (Nguyen, 2012). To
control for the leverage effect which is the higher the leverage
ratio, the more volatile the return (Saunders et al., 1990), we use
the capital to assets ratio, which also accounts for bank
capitalisation.
In terms of macroeconomic variables, we select the Nikkei 225
index as a proxy for the stock market performance, the industrial
production index as a measure of business activity (Ofﬁcer,
1973), and the total reserves held by the Bank of Japan at the
end of each period as a proxy for quantitative easing policy
(Lyonnet and Werner, 2012; Voutsinas and Werner, 2011). The
inclusion of quantitative easing takes into account the effect of
monetary policy in promoting bank lending and adjusting the
performance of contemporary ﬁnancial institutions. During the
observed period, the Bank of Japan applied quantitative easing
from March 2001 to March 2006 in order to maintain the target
inﬂation rate and the level of current account balances held by
depository institutions at the Bank (Berkmen, 2012). In addition,
the purchase of long-term Japanese government bonds – the main
instrument of quantitative easing - and other asset purchase
programs reduced yields (Lam, 2011; Ueda, 2012; Ugai, 2007)
and assisted the Bank of Japan to maintain the ‘‘zero interest rates’’
policy.17 However, in terms of economic activity and inﬂation,
whether or not the quantitative easing policy in Japan was effective
remains ambiguous. Baumeister and Benati (2010) and Girardin and
Moussa (2011) ﬁnd it effective, whereas Ugai (2007) ﬁnds little evi-
dence. Bowman et al. (2011) suggest that the stimulus to economic
growth from quantitative easing might be undermined by excessive
spending on the weak banking system and ﬁrm balance sheet
problems.
To account for market concentration, we use the Herﬁndahl–
Hirschman Index (HHI) (Bikker, 2004). However, as concentration
ratio is a rather crude indicator which measures the actual
market shares disregarding inferences about bank competitiveness
(Beck, 2008), we also use the Boone indicator as a proxy for
competition.18 Regarding risk variables, because most banks in our
sample are not listed, we opt for accounting measures rather than17 Examples of other asset purchase programs: the purchase of asset-backed
securities from July 2003 to March 2006; and the program under the Comprehensive
Monetary Easing in October 2010, which expanded the types of assets purchased into
private sector ﬁnancial assets.
18 The authors gratefully acknowledge the suggestion of an anonymous referee in
choosing a better proxy for competition such as the Boone indicator, as HHI is a poor
indicator of competition compared to non-structural ones. Please see Appendix C for
the methodology used to derive the Boone indicator.
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proxy for banks is the Z-score, which is the number of standard
deviations below the mean by which bank returns would have to fall
so as to dry up capital (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Hannan and
Hanweck, 1988). The higher Z-score indicates bank stability or lower
insolvency risk. More importantly, we introduce risk-monitored
loans as another proxy for risk in our model. As discussed above,
the disaggregation of risk-monitored loans into bankrupt loans and
restructured loans allows us to measure their exogenous effects on
bank efﬁciency and ROA. In the short-run, bankrupt loans and
restructured loans are not subject to the control of bank manage-
ment but the recovery of debtors and their compliance with the loan
contracts.6. Results
6.1. Technical efﬁciency
Regarding input and desirable output elasticities, all the param-
eters are statistically signiﬁcant and consistent with the monotonic
condition. All three inputs exhibit expected negative signs, satisfy-
ing the property of non-increasing in inputs of D(x,y,b), and indi-
cating a smaller distance to the frontier when input usage is
reduced. The magnitude of these coefﬁcients suggests that the con-
tribution of ﬁxed assets (a2 = 0.379) to the production process
outnumbers the other two. More speciﬁcally, the elasticities of
interest expenses and general and administrative expenses are
quite small and similar. The small magnitude of the coefﬁcient of
interest expenses (a1 = 0.0173) could be explained by the imple-
mentation of the virtually zero interest rate during 2000–2006. The
reported coefﬁcient of y1 (0.465) is positively signiﬁcant, conﬁrm-
ing the non-decreasing characteristic in good outputs. This is what
we could expect as loans are the main products of banking opera-
tion. Our ﬁndings also suggest that Japanese commercial banks
experience decreasing returns to scale (0.8427, with associated
standard error of 0.0102 signiﬁcantly different from one at the
1% level). Previous studies have found that decreasing returns to
scale is valid in the case of City Banks (Altunbas et al., 2000;
Azad et al., 2014; Drake and Hall, 2003; Tadesse, 2006); while
Regional Banks exhibit increasing returns to scale (Altunbas
et al., 2000). Therefore, results are rather mixed (see also
Fukuyama, 1993; McKillop et al., 1996).
In terms of undesirable output elasticity, problem loans
(v1 = 0.0261) are found to have a signiﬁcant negative impact on
bank performance, in line with ﬁndings from Glass et al. (2014)
for credit cooperatives. The ﬁnding suggests that problem loansnkrupt and restructured loans on Japanese bank efﬁciency?. J. Bank Finance
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Fig. 2. Technical efﬁciency scores by bank type. Notes: This Figure illustrates kernel
density plots of technical efﬁciency scores by each type of banks.
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istrative expenses in affecting bank efﬁciency. The coefﬁcient of
problem other earning assets – the second bad output in our unde-
sirable output vector, however, is insigniﬁcant. The results might
imply that problem other earning assets are not the main source
of bank inefﬁciency.
Table 2 exhibits technical efﬁciency (TE) scores for three groups
of Japanese commercial banks over each observed period. The
average technical efﬁciency of all banks over the entire period is
0.612, suggesting that Japanese commercial banks can improve
their performance by increasing their desirable outputs by
[(1/0.612)  1] = 63.4%, whereas simultaneously reducing inputs
and bad outputs by [1–0.612] = 38.8%. Overall, the time varying
technical efﬁciency scores of all banks expose a slight downward
trend over time. This is consistent with our ﬁnding of no presence
of technical progress over years. Within each group of banks, there
is a minor variation in the decreasing trend of mean technical efﬁ-
ciency. For example, scores of Regional Banks II dropped after ris-
ing in March 2002, while that of City Banks climbed from 32.93% in
September 2007 to 33.99% in March 2008.
Illustrated in Fig. 2 is kernel density graph mapping the distri-
bution of technical efﬁciency scores by bank type. We ﬁnd that
City Banks are the least efﬁcient banks with average technical efﬁ-
ciency at 34.55% compared to their counterparts, whereas Barros
et al. (2012) ﬁnd a high level of efﬁciency for City Banks. Being
the smallest in bank size, Regional Banks II seem to be the most
efﬁcient with mean TE at 70.49%. A potential explanation for the
high TE of Regional Banks could be that under the Temporary
Measures to Facilitate Financing for SMEs, banks are encouraged
not only to supply loans in favour of SMEs, but also to relax the
conditions of these loans. Under certain conditions, a loan to an
SME debtor about to be classiﬁed as nonperforming could be con-
sidered as performing, as long as the borrower could provide a
promising business reconstruction plan within one year from the
date the loan was due to be nonperforming (Hoshi, 2011).Table 2
Technical efﬁciency scores by bank type over time.
Bank type City banks Regional banks I
Period Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max Obs Mean S
Sep-00 8 0.3700 0.0412 0.3218 0.4325 64 0.5807 0
Mar-01 8 0.3691 0.0412 0.3209 0.4316 64 0.5811 0
Sep-01 8 0.3682 0.0412 0.3200 0.4307 64 0.5835 0
Mar-02 7 0.3697 0.0439 0.3191 0.4298 64 0.5805 0
Sep-02 7 0.3555 0.0625 0.2518 0.4289 64 0.5788 0
Mar-03 7 0.3474 0.0551 0.2509 0.4065 64 0.5769 0
Sep-03 7 0.3465 0.0551 0.2501 0.4056 64 0.5764 0
Mar-04 7 0.3456 0.0550 0.2492 0.4047 64 0.5756 0
Sep-04 7 0.3447 0.0550 0.2483 0.4038 64 0.5718 0
Mar-05 7 0.3438 0.0550 0.2475 0.4029 64 0.5710 0
Sep-05 7 0.3429 0.0550 0.2466 0.4020 64 0.5730 0
Mar-06 6 0.3435 0.0601 0.2458 0.4011 64 0.5723 0
Sep-06 6 0.3426 0.0600 0.2449 0.4002 64 0.5715 0
Mar-07 6 0.3417 0.0600 0.2441 0.3993 64 0.5707 0
Sep-07 6 0.3293 0.0592 0.2432 0.3972 64 0.5699 0
Mar-08 6 0.3399 0.0600 0.2423 0.3974 64 0.5692 0
Sep-08 6 0.3390 0.0600 0.2415 0.3965 64 0.5684 0
Mar-09 6 0.3381 0.0599 0.2406 0.3956 64 0.5676 0
Sep-09 6 0.3373 0.0599 0.2398 0.3947 64 0.5668 0
Mar-10 6 0.3364 0.0599 0.2389 0.3938 64 0.5661 0
Sep-10 6 0.3355 0.0599 0.2381 0.3929 63 0.5665 0
Mar-11 6 0.3346 0.0598 0.2373 0.3920 63 0.5657 0
Sep-11 6 0.3337 0.0598 0.2364 0.3911 63 0.5649 0
Mar-12 6 0.3328 0.0598 0.2356 0.3902 63 0.5642 0
Sep-12 6 0.3319 0.0598 0.2347 0.3892 63 0.5634 0
Mar-13 6 0.3310 0.0598 0.2339 0.3883 63 0.5626 0
All 169 0.3455 0.0530 0.2339 0.4325 1646 0.5715 0
Notes: This Table reports average scores of technical efﬁciency in each period for each typ
technique (Battese and Coelli, 1992). Obs: number of observations; Std.dev: standard de
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performance
In this section, we perform baseline regressions to investigate
the relationship between risk-monitored loans and performance
(technical efﬁciency and return on assets), taking into considera-
tion the impact of bank speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables.
We present results for both a ﬁxed effect model to account for
the unobserved heterogeneity across banks, and a two-stage least
squares model to control for endogeneity. The dependent variables
are: (i) technical efﬁciency TE; and (ii) return on assets ROA. As dis-
cussed in Section 5, we treat bankrupt loans and restructured loans
as measures of risk. The analysis is also conducted for Z-score to
test the robustness of the results. Risk proxies are respectively
incorporated with alternative instruments. The results are reportedRegional banks II
td.dev Min Max Obs Mean Std.dev Min Max
.0922 0.4256 0.8231 55 0.7274 0.1212 0.5150 0.9890
.0926 0.4247 0.8227 55 0.7221 0.1202 0.5142 0.9889
.0923 0.4238 0.8223 55 0.7194 0.1205 0.5133 0.9889
.0918 0.4229 0.8219 55 0.7210 0.1206 0.5125 0.9889
.0930 0.4220 0.8215 55 0.7166 0.1186 0.5116 0.9889
.0927 0.4211 0.8211 52 0.7113 0.1186 0.5108 0.9888
.0936 0.4202 0.8207 50 0.7070 0.1194 0.5099 0.9888
.0937 0.4193 0.8203 49 0.7089 0.1195 0.5091 0.9888
.0914 0.4184 0.8199 48 0.7087 0.1209 0.5082 0.9888
.0915 0.4175 0.8195 47 0.7085 0.1224 0.5073 0.9887
.0933 0.4166 0.8191 47 0.7079 0.1227 0.5065 0.9887
.0934 0.4157 0.8187 46 0.7028 0.1202 0.5056 0.9887
.0935 0.4148 0.8183 46 0.7022 0.1204 0.5048 0.9886
.0936 0.4139 0.8179 45 0.7000 0.1214 0.5039 0.9886
.0937 0.4130 0.8175 44 0.6957 0.1205 0.5031 0.9886
.0939 0.4121 0.8171 44 0.6951 0.1207 0.5022 0.9886
.0940 0.4111 0.8166 44 0.6945 0.1209 0.5013 0.9885
.0941 0.4102 0.8162 43 0.6959 0.1218 0.5005 0.9885
.0942 0.4093 0.8158 43 0.6953 0.1220 0.4996 0.9885
.0943 0.4084 0.8154 41 0.6961 0.1242 0.4988 0.9884
.0946 0.4075 0.8150 41 0.6955 0.1244 0.4979 0.9884
.0948 0.4066 0.8146 41 0.6949 0.1246 0.4970 0.9884
.0949 0.4057 0.8142 41 0.6943 0.1248 0.4962 0.9884
.0950 0.4048 0.8138 41 0.6937 0.1250 0.4953 0.9883
.0951 0.4039 0.8133 40 0.6942 0.1266 0.4945 0.9883
.0952 0.4030 0.8129 40 0.6936 0.1268 0.4936 0.9883
.0930 0.4030 0.8231 1203 0.7050 0.1209 0.4936 0.9890
e of banks. The scores are obtained from estimating Eq. (7), using time-varying decay
viation; Mar: March; Sep: September; 00–13: 2000–2013.
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cator as a proxy for competition are provided in Tables 5 and 6.
For ﬁxed effect models, generally, bankrupt loans and restruc-
tured loans do not affect technical efﬁciency and ROA in a similar
way. The relationship is found positive for these risk-monitored
loans and TE, whereas an inverse one applies for ROA. The inﬂu-
ences are statistically signiﬁcant but small in magnitude. When
we replace risk-monitored loans by Z-score, the same conclusion
can be drawn for the risk - efﬁciency/ROA nexus. Speciﬁcally, while
Z-score shows a negative, insigniﬁcant effect on TE, its inﬂuence on
ROA is positively signiﬁcant. These initial evidences reveal that the
less involvement in risky projects of the bank, the higher the level
of its ROA. Regarding other control variables, higher capital to
assets ratio would increase bank proﬁtability. In a similar aspect,
when the stock price and industrial indices rise, Japanese banks’
performance would be improved. The measure of market concen-
tration, the HHI index, is signiﬁcant in most cases, but the effect
varies. We obtain quite a similar pattern for the inﬂuence of total
reserves.
Given endogeneity concerns, we proceed with a two-stage least
square regression. We examine the model with the same two
dependent variables and alternative instrumental variables for risk
proxies (see Table 4). The impacts of almost all variables are con-
sistent with ﬁndings from the ﬁxed effect models. In terms of bank
characteristics, capitalisation appears to have a positive signiﬁcant
effect on performance, suggesting that banks with lower leverage
ratio operate more efﬁciently, in line with Pasiouras (2008). It is
also well-known in the literature that well-capitalised banks will
have higher ROA than their under-capitalised counterparts
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). Net interest margin also
comes consistently positively signiﬁcant in relation with TE. On
the other hand, the relationship between NIM and ROA is negative,
in accordance with Goldberg and Rai (1996) who argue that more
efﬁcient banks are ﬂexible to offer depositors and borrowers
attractive interest rates. Even though the spread is smaller for
those banks than that of less efﬁcient banks, they could still be able
to generate higher proﬁt thanks to the larger quantity of loans.Table 3
Impact of bankrupt loans and restructured loans on performance – ﬁxed effect models.
Model Model 1 Model 2 M
Dependent variable TE TE T
Capital ratio 0.00265 0.00384 
(0.0028) (0.00258) (
Net interest margin 0.135⁄⁄⁄ 0.122⁄⁄⁄ 0
(0.0098) (0.0096) (
Nikkei index 0.000321 0.000710⁄⁄ 0
(0.000321) (0.000309) (
Industrial production 0.00381⁄⁄⁄ 0.00361⁄⁄⁄ 0
(0.000724) (0.000704) (
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index 0.353⁄⁄⁄ 0.331⁄⁄⁄ 
(0.0041) (0.00429) (
Quantitative easing 0.00129⁄⁄⁄ 0.00129⁄⁄⁄ 
(9.58E-05) (9.22E-05) (
Z-score -5.89E-07
(1.41E-05)
Bankrupt loans 0.00170⁄⁄⁄
(0.000137)
Restructured loans 0
(
Constant 0.632⁄⁄⁄ 0.609⁄⁄⁄ 0
(0.00338) (0.00373) (
R-sq 0.0149 0.0162 0
p value (F-test) 0.00 0.00 0
Notes: This Table reports results of the ﬁxed effect models examining the impact of contr
bankrupt and restructured loans) is alternatively incorporated in the models. Quantitative
ratio)/rROA. Bankrupt loans = Bankrupt loans + Non-accrual loans; Restructured loans =
errors in parentheses, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
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index and industrial production index yield equivalent impact on
TE. A rise in the stock price index would positively affect the efﬁ-
ciency level of Japanese banks. Investment prospects signiﬁed by
a rise in the stock price index could bring promising loan portfolios
to commercial banks. Similar is the case of escalating manufactur-
ing output which denotes an expansion period of the economy. In
addition, the likelihood of nonperforming loans would be expected
to be relatively small. Put differently, ﬁnancial institutions could be
able to expand their good outputs and lessen their bad outputs,
which then help to improve their technical efﬁciency. In terms of
ROA, the results are mixed. An increase in the stock price index
is not necessarily associated with higher ROA. As not many banks
in our sample are listed, the beneﬁt they would acquire from the
difference in stock prices might be negligible compared to the
mounting fund required to purchase those securities. Regional
Banks, in particular, invest mostly in government bonds and local
government bonds, which are less volatile than other securities,
and thus might be indifferent to market volatility.
Another inﬂuential variable is the degree of concentration
which is signiﬁcant and negatively correlated with TE. This ﬁnding
is related to Homma et al. (2014) who report that market concen-
tration dampens cost efﬁciency of large Japanese banks. Coming to
ROA, our evidence suggests a positive impact of HHI. Regardless
the causality, this somehow supports the efﬁcient-structure
hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973; Smirlock, 1985) that banks with larger
market share have greater proﬁtability. Differently phrased, our
ﬁndings could be expressed as heightened competition resulting
in higher likelihood of default, which supports the results of Fu
et al. (2014). Using the Lerner index as a proxy for market power
of Asia Paciﬁc banks (Japanese banks inclusive), they ﬁnd a pres-
ence of the ‘‘competition-fragility’’ hypothesis. Employing the
3-bank concentration ratio, Liu et al. (2012) also report that
South East Asian banks in more concentrated market are less
exposed to systemic risk. With respect to the coefﬁcients of total
reserves, we ﬁnd mixed results for the effect of quantitative easing
on bank performance.odel 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
E ROA ROA ROA
0.00135 0.245⁄⁄⁄ 0.241⁄⁄⁄ 0.251⁄⁄⁄
0.00248) (0.00488) (0.00483) (0.00472)
.108⁄⁄⁄ 0.109⁄⁄⁄ 0.0859⁄⁄⁄ 0.0877⁄⁄⁄
0.0095) (0.0217) (0.0216) (0.022)
.000331 0.00155⁄⁄ 0.00122⁄ 0.00185⁄⁄⁄
0.000301) (0.000713) (0.000695) (0.000698)
.00082 0.00317⁄⁄ 0.00366⁄⁄ 0.00551⁄⁄⁄
0.000713) (0.00161) (0.00158) (0.00165)
0.298⁄⁄⁄ 0.0772⁄⁄⁄ 0.0343⁄⁄⁄ 0.0323⁄⁄⁄
0.00504) (0.00909) (0.00962) (0.0117)
0.00140⁄⁄⁄ 0.000643⁄⁄⁄ 0.000709⁄⁄⁄ 0.000790⁄⁄⁄
9.06E-05) (0.000212) (0.000207) (0.00021)
7.27E-05⁄⁄
(3.08E-05)
0.00283⁄⁄⁄
(0.000308)
.00113⁄⁄⁄ 0.000820⁄⁄⁄
6.81E-05) (0.000158)
.632⁄⁄⁄ 0.0536⁄⁄⁄ 0.0180⁄⁄ 0.0565⁄⁄⁄
0.00318) (0.00749) (0.00839) (0.00736)
.0089 0.4384 0.3872 0.4456
.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ol variables on technical efﬁciency and return on assets. The proxy for risk (Z-score,
easing is proxied by the natural logarithm of total reserves; Z-score = (ROA + capital
past due loans over 3 months but less than 6 months + Restructured loans. Standard
nkrupt and restructured loans on Japanese bank efﬁciency?. J. Bank Finance
Table 4
Impact of bankrupt loans and restructured loans on performance – two-stage least squares models.
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model6 Model 7 Model 8
Dependent variable TE TE TE TE ROA ROA ROA ROA
Capital ratio 0.0756⁄⁄⁄ 0.366⁄⁄ 0.00255 0.00261 0.142⁄⁄⁄ 0.00942 0.235⁄⁄⁄ 0.242⁄⁄⁄
(0.012) (0.156) (0.00425) (0.0032) (0.0187) (0.119) (0.00902) (0.00911)
Net interest margin 0.141⁄⁄⁄ 0.164⁄⁄ 0.135⁄⁄⁄ 0.133⁄⁄⁄ 0.124⁄⁄⁄ 0.145⁄⁄ 0.0741⁄⁄⁄ 0.0977
(0.017) (0.0669) (0.0118) (0.0389) (0.0313) (0.058) (0.0261) (0.128)
Nikkei index 0.00491⁄⁄⁄ 0.0219⁄⁄ 0.000327 0.000319 0.00580⁄⁄⁄ 0.0150⁄ 0.000859 0.00169⁄
(0.000853) (0.00936) (0.000375) (0.000315) (0.00158) (0.00844) (0.000828) (0.000956)
Industrial production 0.00700⁄⁄⁄ 0.0188⁄⁄ 0.00381⁄⁄⁄ 0.00363 0.00201 0.00845 0.00384⁄⁄ 0.0263⁄
(0.00133) (0.00798) (0.00073) (0.00425) (0.00246) (0.00704) (0.00161) (0.0141)
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman Index 0.427⁄⁄⁄ 0.699⁄⁄⁄ 0.353⁄⁄⁄ 0.350⁄⁄⁄ 0.199⁄⁄⁄ 0.352⁄⁄ 0.0133 0.348
(0.0126) (0.149) (0.0124) (0.0773) (0.0237) (0.138) (0.0276) (0.256)
Quantitative easing 0.000156 0.00406⁄ 0.00130⁄⁄⁄ 0.00130⁄⁄⁄ 0.00116⁄⁄⁄ 0.00341 0.000707⁄⁄⁄ 0.00153⁄⁄⁄
(0.000231) (0.00235) (9.46E-05) (0.000174) (0.000422) (0.00208) (0.000208) (0.000574)
Z-score 0.00107⁄⁄⁄ 0.00503⁄⁄ 0.00178⁄⁄⁄ 0.00392⁄⁄
(0.000153) (0.00212) (0.000282) (0.00192)
Bankrupt loans 3.66E-05 0.00441⁄⁄
(0.000877) (0.00197)
Restructured loans 6.67E-05 0.00865
(0.00159) (0.00527)
Constant 0.590⁄⁄⁄ 0.436⁄⁄⁄ 0.632⁄⁄⁄ 0.632⁄⁄⁄ 0.012 0.0942 0.00326 0.0585⁄⁄⁄
(0.00829) (0.0859) (0.0123) (0.00334) (0.0151 (0.0758) (0.0275) (0.0101)
R-sq 0.0175 0.0137 0.0136 0.0119 0.0428 0.0255 0.3113 0.0883
p value (F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: This Table reports results of the two-stage least squares models examining the impact of control variables on technical efﬁciency and return on assets. The proxy for
risk (Z-score, bankrupt and restructured loans) is alternatively incorporated in the models with different instruments. Quantitative easing is proxied by the natural logarithm
of total reserves. Z-score = (ROA + capital ratio)/rROA. Bankrupt loans = Bankrupt loans + Non-accrual loans; Restructured loans = past due loans over 3 months but less than
6 months + Restructured loans. Standard errors in parentheses, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
Table 5
Impact of bankrupt loans and restructured loans on performance – ﬁxed effect models – robustness check.
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Dependent variable TE TE TE ROA ROA ROA
Capital ratio 0.0128⁄⁄⁄ 0.0245⁄ 0.0076 0.2482⁄⁄⁄ 0.2401⁄⁄⁄ 0.2508⁄⁄⁄
(0.0034) (0.0133) (0.0081) (0.0691) (0.0702) (0.0693)
Net interest margin 0.0478⁄⁄⁄ 0.0402⁄⁄⁄ 0.0273⁄⁄ 0.0756⁄⁄ 0.0613⁄⁄ 0.0642⁄⁄
(0.0117) (0.0128) (0.0105) (0.0296) (0.0278) (0.0285)
Nikkei index 0.0027⁄⁄⁄ 0.0003 0.0009⁄⁄⁄ 0.0021⁄⁄⁄ 0.0012⁄ 0.0019⁄⁄⁄
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Industrial production 0.0116⁄⁄⁄ 0.0108⁄⁄⁄ 0.001 0.0015 0.0029⁄⁄ 0.0051⁄⁄⁄
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0015) (0.0011) (0.0013)
Boone indicator 0.1003⁄⁄⁄ 0.0824⁄⁄⁄ 0.0551⁄⁄⁄ 0.0272⁄⁄⁄ 0.0154⁄⁄ 0.0134⁄
(0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0035) (0.0076) (0.0064) (0.008)
Quantitative easing 0.0055⁄⁄⁄ 0.0046⁄⁄⁄ 0.0039⁄⁄⁄ 0.0017⁄⁄⁄ 0.0012⁄⁄⁄ 0.0012⁄⁄⁄
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Z-score 0.0003⁄⁄⁄ 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001)
Bankrupt loans 0.0046⁄⁄⁄ 0.003⁄⁄⁄
(0.0005) (0.0006)
Restructured loans 0.0031⁄⁄⁄ 0.0009⁄⁄⁄
(0.0003) (0.0002)
Constant 0.6378⁄⁄⁄ 0.5655⁄⁄⁄ 0.6298⁄⁄⁄ 0.0546⁄⁄⁄ 0.0149 0.0558⁄⁄⁄
(0.0031) (0.0079) (0.0039) (0.008) (0.0106) (0.0065)
R-sq 0.004 0.2767 0.1971 0.4805 0.3764 0.092
p value (F-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: This Table reports results of the ﬁxed effect models examining the impact of control variables on technical efﬁciency and return on assets. We replace HHI with the
Boone indicator as a proxy for competition. The proxy for risk (Z-score, bankrupt and restructured loans) is alternatively incorporated in the models. Quantitative easing is
proxied by the natural logarithm of total reserves; Z-score = (ROA + capital ratio)/rROA. Bankrupt loans = Bankrupt loans + Non-accrual loans; Restructured loans = past due
loans over 3 months but less than 6 months + Restructured loans. Standard errors in parentheses, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
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two-stage least square models conﬁrm the impact of bankrupt
loans and restructured loans on performance. The results represent
a positive relationship between risk-monitored loans and TE,
though the impact is statistically insigniﬁcant. In contrast, these
loans negatively affect ROA, with restructured loans being negligi-
ble compared to bankrupt loans. Our ﬁndings are reinforced when
Z-score is used, and support the results from ﬁxed effect models.
When HHI is replaced by the Boone indicator as a robustness
exercise, the impact stemming from most control variables on
TE/ROA is conﬁrmed. Noteworthy, the effects of capitalisation,Please cite this article in press as: Mamatzakis, E., et al. What is the impact of ba
(2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2015.04.010the stock price index, and Z-score vary compared to prior results.
In model 1 reported in Table 5, capital ratio is found to be nega-
tively associated with TE, whilst the relationship turns out positive
in the other models. There is an ambiguous picture for the effect of
stock price index on performance as the Nikkei index consistently
becomes negative in affecting TE. Z-score, previously found
insigniﬁcant in model 1-Table 3, appears positive and signiﬁcant.
Yet, the magnitude of the effect is approximately zero, similar to
the former result. We also ﬁnd the same variation for these vari-
ables in our two-stage least square analysis, except the effect of
capital ratio which is convincingly positive and signiﬁcant.nkrupt and restructured loans on Japanese bank efﬁciency?. J. Bank Finance
Table 6
Impact of bankrupt loans and restructured loans on performance – two-stage least squares models – Robustness check.
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model6 Model 7 Model 8
Dependent variable TE TE TE TE ROA ROA ROA ROA
Capital ratio 0.1152⁄⁄ 0.0583 0.0685⁄⁄⁄ 0.0254⁄⁄⁄ 0.1453⁄⁄⁄ 0.184⁄⁄⁄ 0.1859⁄⁄⁄ 0.2065⁄⁄⁄
(0.0483) (0.0371) (0.0076) (0.0067) (0.0295) (0.0282) (0.0103) (0.0104)
Net interest margin 0.1098⁄⁄⁄ 0.0854⁄⁄⁄ 0.0667⁄⁄⁄ 0.0471⁄⁄⁄ 0.0931⁄⁄⁄ 0.0559⁄⁄⁄ 0.0622⁄⁄⁄ 0.0639⁄⁄⁄
(0.0197) (0.0178) (0.016) (0.0142) (0.0224) (0.0202) (0.0218) (0.0222)
Nikkei index 0.0028⁄⁄⁄ 0.0048⁄⁄⁄ 0.0016⁄⁄⁄ 0.002⁄⁄⁄ 0.0018⁄⁄ 0.0031⁄⁄⁄ 0.0014⁄⁄ 0.002⁄⁄⁄
(0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Industrial Production 0.0181⁄⁄⁄ 0.0139⁄⁄⁄ 0.0132⁄⁄⁄ 0.0015⁄⁄⁄ 0.0008 0.0025 0.0028⁄ 0.006⁄⁄⁄
(0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0011) (0.001) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Boone indicator 0.0962⁄⁄⁄ 0.0964⁄⁄⁄ 0.0757⁄⁄⁄ 0.0458⁄⁄⁄ 0.0227⁄⁄⁄ 0.021⁄⁄⁄ 0.0124⁄⁄⁄ 0.0073⁄
(0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0036) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0042)
Quantitative easing 0.0042⁄⁄⁄ 0.0049⁄⁄⁄ 0.0038⁄⁄⁄ 0.0031⁄⁄⁄ 0.0011⁄⁄⁄ 0.0014⁄⁄⁄ 0.001⁄⁄⁄ 0.0009⁄⁄⁄
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Z-score 0.0003 0.0005⁄⁄⁄ 0.0003⁄⁄ 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
Bankrupt loans 0.0054⁄⁄⁄ 0.0032⁄⁄⁄
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Restructured loans 0.0035⁄⁄⁄ 0.0012⁄⁄⁄
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 0.6031⁄⁄⁄ 0.6357⁄⁄⁄ 0.5464⁄⁄⁄ 0.6235⁄⁄⁄ 0.0397⁄⁄⁄ 0.0603⁄⁄⁄ 0.0105 0.0539⁄⁄⁄
(0.0106) (0.0086) (0.0059) (0.0043) (0.0097) (0.0085) (0.008) (0.0068)
R-sq 0.0207 0.006 0.3267 0.2337 0.0792 0.1156 0.092 0.14
p value (chi2-test) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: This Table reports results of the two-stage least squares models examining the impact of control variables on technical efﬁciency and return on assets. We replace HHI
with the Boone indicator as a proxy for competition. The proxy for risk (Z-score, bankrupt and restructured loans) is alternatively incorporated in the models with different
instruments. Quantitative easing is proxied by the natural logarithm of total reserves. Z-score = (ROA + capital ratio)/rROA. Bankrupt loans = Bankrupt loans + Non-accrual
loans; Restructured loans = past due loans over 3 months but less than 6 months + Restructured loans. Standard errors in parentheses, ⁄⁄⁄p < 0.01, ⁄⁄p < 0.05, ⁄p < 0.1.
19 To relax the restriction that all cross-sectional units in our panel data are the
same, we incorporate the ﬁxed effect li, which is correlated with lags of the
dependent variable. To remove the ﬁxed effect in estimation without eliminating the
orthogonality between the transformed variables and lagged regressors, we use
forward mean-differencing, referred as the ‘‘Helmert procedure’’ (Arellano and Bover,
1995). The standard errors of the impulse response functions and their conﬁdence
intervals are estimated by Monte Carlo simulations. To illustrate the percent of
variation in one variable explained by the shock in another variable, we perform the
variance decompositions (VDCs). We report the accumulated total effects through 10
and 20 periods ahead. Please see Appendix B for the model speciﬁcation.
20 It is essential to select the optimal lag order j of the right-hand side variables in
the equation system before estimation (Lütkepohl, 2007). It is constructed using the
Arellano-Bover GMM estimator for the lags of j = 1, 2 and 3 and the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) to decide the optimal lag order. The lag order 1 is
proposed by the AIC, which is conﬁrmed by the Arellano-Bond AR tests. More lags
were added to detect evidence of autocorrelation. The null hypothesis of no
autocorrelation for lag ordered one is not rejected in Sargan tests. According to the
results from those tests, we estimate VAR of order one, also not to lose information
and reduce degrees of freedom. Additionally, we perform normality tests for the
residuals, employing the Shapiro-Francia W-test. The results conﬁrm that there is no
violation of the normality.
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negative relationship between quantitative easing and TE, whereas
it is positive in the case of ROA. A potential explanation could lie on
fewer interest expenses due to the virtually zero interest rate
policy that could results in higher returns on assets. However,
expansionary policy which stimulates investments and funding,
especially when aiming to channelling credit to SMEs, could create
a latent problem of adverse selection and decelerate the
progress of contracting problem loans (International Monetary
Fund, 2003). Low interest rates could also heighten banks’
risk-tolerance through higher asset prices and collateral values
(Altunbas et al., 2010). Given the adverse effect of the banking
crisis in Japan, a contrast experience of risk-aversion could also
prevail, causing banks which had undergone the tough period to
hesitate to extend credit. In fact, although ample liquidity was
provided by quantitative easing, bank lending did not rise propor-
tionately during 1999–2005 (Ito, 2006).
The results are robust for the impact of competition on
performance. Indicated in Boone et al. (2007), the larger the
Boone indicator in absolute value signiﬁes the higher the degree
of competition. The reported coefﬁcient of the Boone indicator in
Tables 5 and 6 conﬁrm the competition – efﬁciency nexus
hypothesising that heightened competition would stimulate banks
to minimise costs and maximise outputs (Andries and Ca˘praru,
2014; Schaeck and Cihák, 2008). In contrast, we ﬁnd that intensi-
ﬁed competition would reﬁne returns on assets of Japanese banks.
This ﬁnding somewhat supports the ‘‘competition-fragility’’
hypothesis in the sense that tougher degree of competition puts
more pressure on proﬁt and eventually could lead to ﬁnancial
instability (Keeley, 1990). On the other hand, as the Boone
indicator conveys bank market power, our result is more robust
in supporting ﬁndings of Fu et al. (2014) previously mentioned.
Evidence of this hypothesis is also conﬁrmed for Japanese banking
in Liu and Wilson (2013).
In terms of risk variables, both bankrupt and restructured loans
signiﬁcantly affect TE, which support the ‘‘moral hazard’’ and
‘‘skimping’’ hypotheses. It is worth noting that until this stage,
we have not been able to assess the causality relationship between
risk-monitored loans and efﬁciency. These ﬁndings should bePlease cite this article in press as: Mamatzakis, E., et al. What is the impact of ba
(2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2015.04.010treated with some caution and it is the analysis of the panel VAR
model that would shed light into their underlying relationships.6.3. Panel VAR analysis
To capture the underlying dynamics, we apply panel Vector
Autoregression (VAR) methodology. A VAR model allows us to
relax any priori assumptions about the relationship between vari-
ables in the model. Instead, all variables entering the model are
considered endogenous within a system of equations. We also
account for unobserved individual heterogeneity in our panel data
by specifying individual speciﬁc terms (Love and Zicchino, 2006).19
Figs. 3 and 4 illustrate the impulse responses (IRFs) for 1 lag VAR
technical efﬁciency, net interest margin, quantitative easing, bank-
rupt loans and restructured loans. The variance decompositions
(VDCs) are reported in Tables 7 and 8.20
IRFs diagram describes the response of each variable in the VAR
system to its own innovations and to innovations of other vari-
ables. The last diagram on the ﬁrst row of Fig. 3 shows that the
response of TE to a shock in bankrupt loans is positive but smallnkrupt and restructured loans on Japanese bank efﬁciency?. J. Bank Finance
Fig. 3. IRFs for TE, NIM, QE, Bankrupt loans. Notes: This ﬁgure illustrates the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with respect to one standard
deviation shock in other variables. TE: technical efﬁciency; NIM: net interest margin; QE: quantitative easing, proxied by the natural logarithm of total reserves; Risk 1:
Bankrupt loans = Bankrupt loans + Non-accrual loans, s: number of periods. Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo simulation.
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bankrupt loans will raise technical efﬁciency visibly in the ﬁrst
three periods. After the ﬁrst two periods, the conﬁdence interval
becomes wider. Hence, we could deduce that in the short-run,
the relationship initiates from bankrupt loans to efﬁciency. This
ﬁnding is related to the ‘‘moral hazard’’ and ‘‘skimping’’ hypothesis,
in line with Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis (2009) who
report similar causality. Altunbas et al. (2007) also ﬁnd that more
efﬁcient European banks take on more risk. Under the ‘‘moral haz-
ard, skimping’’ hypothesis, bank efﬁciency could be improved
because of less inputs used corresponding to credit screening, loan
monitoring and management. Banks might also be induced to
involve in more credit screening relaxation to offset the loss of
problem loans (Fiordelisi et al., 2011). This particular ﬁnding for
Japan in terms of reverse causality could reﬂect the effect of quan-
titative easing through bank lending. Previously discussed in
Section 2, apart from the central period of quantitative easing,
the Bank of Japan has pursued aggressive unconventional mone-
tary policy since December 2012 in accordance with the
Abenomics. On the other hand, the potential ‘‘moral hazard’’ prob-
lem could also arise from government support and SMEs ﬁnancing
facilitation. The fact that bank lending expands could increase the
likelihood of problem loans, followed by the rise of efﬁciency due
to the attempt to ‘‘skip’’ management practices of bank managers.
The ﬁrst diagram in the last row of Fig. 3 provides evidence of
the reverse causal relationship between efﬁciency and bankrupt
loans. In the short-run of the ﬁrst two years, the response of bank-
rupt loans to a one standard deviation shock in technical efﬁciency
is positive. The relationship might be explained under the ‘‘bad
management’’ hypothesis. The magnitude of the response of bank-
rupt loans to a shock in TE (estimated at about 0.025 in the ﬁrstPlease cite this article in press as: Mamatzakis, E., et al. What is the impact of ba
(2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2015.04.010period) is larger than the magnitude of the response of efﬁciency
to bankrupt loans’ innovations. The response of bankrupt loans
turns out to be negative thereafter, reaching a value around
0.006 in the last observed period. We treat this ﬁnding with cau-
tion as the conﬁdence interval expands after the ﬁrst period. This
case would imply that the ‘‘risk-averse management’’ hypothesis
might come into play.
Interestingly, the causal relationship between restructured
loans and efﬁciency lends support to the ‘‘bad luck’’ hypothesis.
The last diagram on the ﬁrst row of Fig. 4 reveals that a one stan-
dard deviation shock in restructured loans would generate a nega-
tive response in efﬁciency. The magnitude of the effect is small but
statistically signiﬁcant in the short-run. The reverse causality is
rejected as indicated in the ﬁrst diagram on the last row of Fig. 4
where we observe an insigniﬁcant response of restructured loans
to a shock in efﬁciency. In line with the ‘‘bad luck’’ hypothesis,
the relationship runs from restructured loans to efﬁciency, and car-
ries a negative sign. When unexpected events lead to a rise in
restructured loans, bank managers divert their focus to deal with
delinquencies and loan supervision rather than daily operation.
Additional operating costs associated with credit screening, loan
monitoring, collateral liquidating, and writing-off bad debts would
lessen bank efﬁciency.
In Fig. 3, we observe a positive reaction of technical efﬁciency to
a shock on net interest margin. A one standard deviation shock of
net interest margin induces a positive response of technical efﬁ-
ciency, though the overall magnitude is small. In contrast, in
Fig. 4, the response of efﬁciency to a shock in net interest margin
is negative after the ﬁrst period. Regarding the response of techni-
cal efﬁciency to a one standard deviation shock in monetary policy
as measured by quantitative easing, the results suggest a negativenkrupt and restructured loans on Japanese bank efﬁciency?. J. Bank Finance
Fig. 4. IRFs for TE, NIM, QE, Restructured loans. Notes: This ﬁgure illustrates the impulse-response functions (IRFs) of each endogenous variable with respect to one standard
deviation shock in other variables. TE: technical efﬁciency; NIM: net interest margin; QE: quantitative easing, proxied by the natural logarithm of total reserves; Risk 2:
Restructured loans = past due loans over 3 months but less than 6 months + Restructured loan; s: number of periods. Errors are 5% on each side generated by Monte-Carlo
simulation.
Table 7
VDCs for TE, NIM, QE, and bankrupt loans.
s TE NIM QE Risk 1
TE 10 0.46662 0.08145 0.31208 0.13985
NIM 10 0.00584 0.8225 0.07089 0.10076
QE 10 0.03862 0.07714 0.73385 0.1504
Risk 1 10 0.01693 0.06092 0.14121 0.78094
TE 20 0.39274 0.08014 0.41575 0.11137
NIM 20 0.00596 0.82179 0.0714 0.10085
QE 20 0.03881 0.07709 0.73088 0.15322
Risk 1 20 0.01693 0.06018 0.1454 0.77749
Notes: This Table reports the Variance Decompositions for the panel VAR with
Bankrupt loans as a proxy for risk level. VDCs illustrate the percent of variation in
one variable explained by the shock in another variable. We report the accumulated
total effects through 10 and 20 periods ahead. TE: technical efﬁciency; NIM: net
interest margin; QE: quantitative easing, proxied by the natural logarithm of total
reserves; Risk 1: Bankrupt loans = Bankrupt loans + Non-accrual loans; s: number of
periods.
Table 8
VDCs for TE, NIM, QE, and restructured loans.
s TE NIM QE Risk 2
TE 10 0.33457 0.01407 0.37134 0.28003
NIM 10 0.04916 0.7348 0.00017 0.21587
QE 10 0.20278 0.03459 0.52593 0.23671
Risk 2 10 0.0103 0.07479 0.00011 0.91481
TE 20 0.22804 0.02697 0.29995 0.44504
NIM 20 0.04616 0.67761 0.00029 0.27593
QE 20 0.16634 0.04224 0.42544 0.36598
Risk 2 20 0.01131 0.07448 0.0004 0.91381
Notes: This Table reports the Variance Decompositions for the panel VAR with
Restructured loans as a proxy for risk level. VDCs illustrate the percent of variation
in one variable explained by the shock in another variable. We report the accu-
mulated total effects through 10 and 20 periods ahead. TE: technical efﬁciency;
NIM: net interest margin; QE: quantitative easing, proxied by the natural logarithm
of total reserves; Risk 2: Restructured loans = past due loans over 3 months but less
than 6 months + Restructured loans; s: number of periods.
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These ﬁndings also further defend those reported in Tables 5 and 6.
Both Figs. 3 and 4 indicate a signiﬁcant impact of a shock in net
interest margin on the response of quantitative easing. This implies
total reserves which act as a proxy for quantitative easing would
decline if there is a shock to net interest margin. In terms of the
effect of a shock in technical efﬁciency on quantitative easing, we
ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant response of quantitative easing
(though only in the ﬁrst two periods when bankrupt loans are
included in the model). The positive response gradually declines
over time, with greater magnitude when restructured loans are
in the equation system.Please cite this article in press as: Mamatzakis, E., et al. What is the impact of ba
(2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2015.04.010The effect of a shock in net interest margin on bankrupt loans
and restructured loans is found to be positively important. There
is no speciﬁc pattern as the response of bankrupt loans to a shock
in net interest margin varies over time, but overall exhibits a
diminishing trend. The peak response takes place after period 1,
with a large magnitude of about 0.05; while that magnitude is rel-
atively stable around 0.1 for the response of restructured loans.
Turning to the macroeconomic shock, the impact of a shock in
quantitative easing on bankrupt loans is positively signiﬁcant only
in the ﬁrst period; while it is insigniﬁcant on restructured loans. A
weak implication here is, in the short-run, if the Bank of Japan
reduces their asset purchase, interest rates might rise and borrow-
ers would face extra costs associated with their future repayments.
The probability that bankrupt loans increase would be more likely.nkrupt and restructured loans on Japanese bank efﬁciency?. J. Bank Finance
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8 enlighten our IRFs results. We report the total effect accumulated
over 10 and 20 periods ahead. In Table 7, quantitative easing is
found to explain 31.2% the forecast error variance of efﬁciency, fol-
lowed by bankrupt loans which account for approximately 14% of
the variance after 10 periods. The percent of variation in TE attrib-
uted to a shock in quantitative easing is higher for 20 periods
ahead (increases to 41.6%). In contrast, TE’s variation described
by a shock in bankrupt loans decreases to 11.1%. On the other hand,
a small part of nearly 1.7% forecast error variance 10 and 20
periods ahead in bankrupt loans is due to the shock in technical
efﬁciency. This implies the causality runs from bankrupt loans to
efﬁciency, suggesting that the ‘‘bad luck’’ hypothesis could be valid.
If we also take into account the ﬁndings from the IRFs, the ‘‘moral
hazard’’ and ‘‘skimping’’ hypothesis is more appropriate to explain
the relationship between risk and efﬁciency. Note that risk triggers
the causal chain as indicated by the VDCs estimations.
In the case of restructured loans (Table 8), quantitative easing is
also important in explaining 37.1% the forecast error variance of
efﬁciency over 10 periods. Disturbances in restructured loans
account for 28% of efﬁciency’s variation, and become more
prominent in explaining up to 44.5% after 20 periods. In contrast,
efﬁciency’s innovations account for only about 1% variation of
restructured loans. These results reinforce ﬁndings from the IRFs
in the sense that the causality runs from restructured loans to
efﬁciency, in line with the ‘‘bad luck’’ hypothesis.
Bankrupt loans and restructured loans are found to elucidate a
large percent of the variation on net interestmargin and quantitative
easing. In contrast, the shock in net interest margin accounts for a
small percent of variation in bankrupt loans (about 6%) and restruc-
tured loans (about 7.5%), conﬁrming the causality would run from
bankrupt and restructured loans to net interest margin. In the case
of restructured loans,21 this ﬁnding supports the argument in
Angbazo (1997), Wong (1997), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999).
Net interest margin would increase in response to a higher degree of
risk as banks require a higher rate of return to offset the potential loss
from risky portfolios. Interestingly, the causal relation between quanti-
tative easing and bankrupt loans is not persuasively conﬁrmed as being
run from bankrupt loans. A shock in bankrupt loans explains slightly
more variation in the forecast error of quantitative easing (15%) in com-
parisonwith a shock in quantitative easing interpretingbankrupt loans’
variation (14%). Either way, the relationship carries a positive sign.
However, it is evident that the relationship would run from restruc-
tured loans to quantitative easing. In general, our analysis indicates
that bankrupt and restructured loans cause the changes of TE and
other variables, rather than being affected.
7. Conclusion
This paper provides an additional angle of how to model bank
production process so as to include undesirable outputs. We cover
a large period that allows us to extensively analyse the changes in
bank efﬁciency and its response to shocks. We report that
Japanese banks’ efﬁciency remains rather lowwith amean technical
efﬁciency level of 0.612. The slight downward trend of efﬁciency
also implies that banks do not seem to fully revive or performmore
efﬁciently after overcoming the crisis. We further ﬁnd that Regional
Banks II operate more efﬁciently than their counterparts do. Unlike
Barros et al. (2012), our ﬁndings show that City Banks are less efﬁ-
cient than Regional Banks. Regarding the impacts of undesirable
outputs, problem loans are more inﬂuential in efﬁciency estimation
than problem other earning assets. The model suggests that
Japanese banks could increase their good outputs by 63.4%, whilst
simultaneously reducing bad outputs and inputs by 38.8%. To21 Please refer to Fig. 4, second row, last diagram.
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and investment portfolios to achieve the optimal desirable output
mix. Additionally, investing in technology innovation would assist
a bank to be ahead of their peers in attracting customers. Although
short-runcostswouldrise, thebeneﬁtsforcustomersandlong-termcost
savings could generate higher efﬁciency in the long-run.
In the latter stage analysis, we explore the impact of bankrupt
loans and restructured loans on bank efﬁciency. We report that
the response of technical efﬁciency is positive to a shock in bank-
rupt loans, but negative to a shock in restructured loans. There are
evidences showing that bankrupt and restructured loans signiﬁ-
cantly explain the variation in technical efﬁciency, net interest
margin, and quantitative easing. The relationship between bank-
rupt loans and efﬁciency resembles the ‘‘moral hazard’’ and
‘‘skimping’’ hypotheses, with the causality originating from bank-
rupt loans to efﬁciency. Banks would appear to be more efﬁcient
in the short-run because of fewer inputs associated with the
loan-issuing process, and the motivation to compensate the loss
from bankrupt loans. However, restructured loans are revealed to
affect efﬁciency under the ‘‘bad luck’’ hypothesis. When restruc-
tured loans arise due to unexpected events, banks might face
excessive operating costs to defend their ﬁnancial health. We also
examine the impact of quantitative easing on bank efﬁciency. We
argue that changes in monetary policy diminish technical efﬁ-
ciency in the short-run, but with a small magnitude. This ﬁnding
implies that quantitative easing tool might not be useful in
strengthening bank performance. Among the panel VAR variables,
a shock in net interest margin - a bank speciﬁc factor - does not
greatly explain the variation of efﬁciency.
Our analysis sheds light for regulators and supervisors in terms
of maintaining ﬁnancial stability. There is evidence to convince
that the favourable appearance of bank efﬁciency corresponds to
more risky portfolios which are represented by the level of bank-
rupt loans. Regulators might need to prudently control the level
of risk-taking in commercial banks as well as their loan issuance
process. On the other hand, based on ﬁndings from the impact of
restructured loans on efﬁciency, effective regulatory procedures
to preserve and enhance ﬁnancial stability would help lessen bank
default risk and improve performance. Both highly efﬁcient banks
and worst performers should be supervised thoroughly as their
efﬁciency scores act as a warning for heightened uncertainty.
In light with the ongoing Abenomics policy to drive Japan out of
the deﬂation cycle, our ﬁnding for the impact of quantitative easing
on technical efﬁciency and bankrupt loans could be supportive for
future research in the Bank of Japan monetary easing policy. As
there is no consensus evidence in the literature about the effective-
ness of quantitative easing during March 2001-March 2006, the
continuation of the zero interest rate policy and asset purchase
programs from 2012 could provide an interesting platform for
investigating their impact on bank productivity and ﬁnancial sta-
bility. Not exclusively, one could directly control for the effect of
bankrupt and restructured loans in measuring Japanese bank pro-
ductivity growth. Departing from this study, we would conjecture
a detrimental impact of these risk-monitored loans on bank pro-
ductivity. Moreover, future research could decompose total factor
productivity growth into different components which account for
the particular effect of bankrupt and restructured loans.
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Reconstruction Law and Risk-monitored loans
Bankrupt and  
quasi-bankrupt assets 
Total loans     Other assets 
Problem assets based on the 
Financial Reconstruction Law 
Risk-monitored loans 
Total loans 
Doubtful assets 
Substandard loans 
(A) 
Bankrupt loans 
Non-accrual loans 
Past due loans (3 
months or more) 
Restructured loans 
(B) 
Other assets 
(C) 
A. Problem assets based on the Financial Reconstruction Law and Risk-monitored 
loans 
Note: (A) – (B) = (C) 
Notes: This Appendix presents the two classiﬁcations of problem
assets in Japan. The difference between the two is other assets
which are problem other earning assets (claims related to securities
lending, foreign exchanges, accrued interests, suspense payments,
customers’ liabilities for acceptances and guarantees, and bank-
guaranteed bonds sold through private placements). Risk-monitored
loans are disclosed in accordance with the Banking Law, which we
use to represent the potential risk. In this paper, Bankrupt loans are
named after the sum of Bankrupt loans and Non-accrual loans;
Restructured loans are named after the sum of past due loans over
3 months but less than 6months and Restructured loans. Problem
loans are the sum of bankrupt, quasi-bankrupt, doubtful loans and
substandard loans. Problem other earning assets are the sum of bank-
rupt, quasi-bankrupt, and doubtful other earning assets. Source:
Interim report 2010-Sumitomo Mitsui Financial group.
Appendix B. Panel VAR model
The ﬁrst order VAR model takes the form of:
wit ¼ li þUwit1 þ ei;t i ¼ 1; . . . ;N; t ¼ 1; . . . ; T ðB:1Þ
where wit is a vector of four random variables, technical efﬁciency
Ef, net interest margin NIM, quantitative easing QE, and risk R (bank-
rupt and restructured loans),U is a 4x4 matrix of coefﬁcients, li is a
vector of m individual effects, l0t is a time dummy, and ei,t is a mul-
tivariate white-noise vector of m residuals. The equation system to
be estimated is as follows:Efit ¼ l1i0 þ l10t þ
XJ
j¼1
a11Efitj þ
XJ
j¼1
a12NIMitj þ
XJ
j¼1
a13QEitj þ
XJ
j¼1
a
NIMit ¼ l2i0 þ l20t þ
XJ
j¼1
a21Efitj þ
XJ
j¼1
a22NIMitj þ
XJ
j¼1
a23QEitj þ
XJ
j¼1
a
QEit ¼ l3i0 þ l30t þ
XJ
j¼1
a31Efitj þ
XJ
j¼1
a32NIMitj þ
XJ
j¼1
a33QEitj þ
XJ
j¼1
a
Rit ¼ l4i0 þ l40t þ
XJ
j¼1
a41Efitj þ
XJ
j¼1
a42NIMitj þ
XJ
j¼1
a43QEitj þ
XJ
j¼1
a
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(2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankﬁn.2015.04.010The residuals ei,t captures the exogenous shocks to the endogenous
variables in the VAR system. The moving average (MA) representa-
tion equates Efit, NIMit, QEit and Rit on present and past residuals e1,
e2, e3 and e4 from the VAR estimation:
Efit ¼ a10þ
X1
j¼1
b11je1itjþ
X1
j¼1
b12je2itjþ
X1
j¼1
b13je3itjþ
X1
j¼1
b14je4itj
NIMit ¼ a20þ
X1
j¼1
b21je1itjþ
X1
j¼1
b22je2itjþ
X1
j¼1
b23je3itjþ
X1
j¼1
b24je4itj
QEit ¼ a30þ
X1
j¼1
b31je1itjþ
X1
j¼1
b32je2itjþ
X1
j¼1
b33je3itjþ
X1
j¼1
b34je4itj
Rit ¼ a40þ
X1
j¼1
b41je1itjþ
X1
j¼1
b42je2itjþ
X1
j¼1
b43je3itjþ
X1
j¼1
b44je4itj
ðB:3Þ
The composite error term in the underlying structural model con-
tains no economic implication, unless the equation is transformed.
The orthogonalisation of impulse responses enables us to interpret
the reaction of one variable to a shock in another variable in the sys-
tem. Love and Zicchino (2006) opt for this technique in order to sep-
arate the inﬂuence of different variables in one variable of interest
by holding other shocks constant. Because it is very unlikely that
the covariance matrix of the error terms is diagonal, it is required
that the residuals are decomposed following a procedure (such as
Cholesky decomposition) to become orthogonal. A particular order-
ing is speciﬁed according to the degree of endogeneity of each vari-
able. It is assumed that the variables appear ﬁrst are more
exogenous, and the ones appear later are more endogenous. The
orthogonalised, or structural, MA representation is:
Efit ¼a10þ
X1
j¼1
b11je1itjþ
X1
j¼1
b12je2itjþ
X1
j¼1
b13je3itjþ
X1
j¼1
b14je4itj
NIMit ¼a20þ
X1
j¼1
b21je1itjþ
X1
j¼1
b22je2itjþ
X1
j¼1
b23je3itjþ
X1
j¼1
b24je4itj
QEit ¼a30þ
X1
j¼1
b31je1itjþ
X1
j¼1
b32je2itjþ
X1
j¼1
b33je3itjþ
X1
j¼1
b34je4itj
Rit ¼a40þ
X1
j¼1
b41je1itjþ
X1
j¼1
b42je2itjþ
X1
j¼1
b43je3itjþ
X1
j¼1
b44je4itj
ðB:4Þ
and
b11jb12jb13jb14j
b21jb22jb23jb24j
b31jb32jb33jb34j
b41jb42jb43jb44j
0
BBB@
1
CCCA¼
b11jb12jb13jb14j
b21jb22jb23jb24j
b31jb32jb33jb34j
b41jb42jb43jb44j
0
BBB@
1
CCCAP
e1it
e2it
e3it
e4it
0
BBB@
1
CCCA¼ P1
e1it
e2it
e3it
e4it
0
BBB@
1
CCCA
ðB:5Þ14Ritj þ e1i;t
24Ritj þ e2i;t
34Ritj þ e3i;t
44Ritj þ e4i;t
ðB:2Þ
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the residuals:
Covðe1it ; e1itÞCovðe1it ; e2itÞCovðe1it; e3itÞCovðe1it; e4itÞ
Covðe2it ; e1itÞCovðe2it ; e2itÞCovðe2it; e3itÞCovðe2it; e4itÞ
Covðe3it ; e1itÞCovðe3it ; e2itÞCovðe3it; e3itÞCovðe3it; e4itÞ
Covðe4it ; e1itÞCovðe4it ; e2itÞCovðe4it; e3itÞCovðe4it; e4itÞ
0
BBB@
1
CCCA ¼ PP1
ðB:6ÞAppendix C. The Boone indicator
Derived from the log-linear relationship between marginal cost
mc and proﬁt p in equation C.1, the Boone indicator should be gen-
erally negative (Boone et al., 2007). The larger the Boone indicator
in absolute value, the more intensiﬁed the competition.
lnpi ¼ aþ b lnmci ðC:1Þ
In order to obtain time-varying Boone indicator, we add a time
dummy dt and run the following regression (Schaeck and Cihák,
2014; Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2011):
lnpit ¼ ai þ
XT
t¼1
btdt lnmcit þ
XT1
t¼1
ctdt þ uit ðC:2Þ
In line with Fiordelisi and Mare (2014), marginal cost is obtained
from the translog cost function:
ln TCit ¼ a0 þ a1 lnQ þ a22 lnQ
2 þ
X2
j¼1
bj ln Pj þ
1
2
X2
j¼1
X2
k¼1
djk
 ln Pj ln Pk þ
X2
j¼1
cj lnQ lnPj þu1t þ
1
2
u2t
2 þu3t
 lnQ þ
X2
j¼1
ujt lnPj þ eit ðC:3Þ
where TCit is total costs which are the sum of interest and invest-
ment expenses, and general and administrative expenses; Q is total
earning assets (loans, investments, and securities) (Delis, 2012).
Price of funds P1 is deﬁned as interest and investment expenses/de-
posits and borrowed funds. Due to data unavailability, we are unable
to extract data from general and administrative expenses which
include personnel expenses and non-personnel expenses associated
to physical capital. Hence, in line with Hensel (2006) and Fu et al.
(2014), we deﬁne the second input price as price of overhead P2 as
general and administrative expenses divided by the number of
employees. Time trend is t, and eit is a two-component error term
capturing inefﬁciency and a two-sided error term.
The marginal costs can be derived from Eq.(C.3) as follows (Fu
et al., 2014):
MCit ¼ TCitQ it
ða1 þ a2 lnQ þ
X2
j¼1
cj lnPj þu3tÞ ðC:4ÞReferences
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